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Wallace Stevens begins his poem, “The Pleasures of
Merely Circulating,” with delicious nonsense: “The
garden flew round with the angel, / The angel flew
round with the clouds, / And the clouds flew round
and the clouds flew round / And the clouds flew
round with the clouds.” But I want to
from these
giddy circles and come down to earth, asking the
reader to join me on a journey less certain of its plea
sures. Come down, then; let us run the length of this
field, sallying back and forth between two illmatched citations: the first an inviting statement of
purpose from a new academic journal, the second an
oddly moving, oddly spectral statement from Derrida:

Journal x is not committed to any particular set of
answers or even approaches to the question of
pleasure, only to the question itself. . . . Our
immediate editorial goal is a good deal more
modest, indirect, and open-ended: to serve as a
sort of ongoing research archive into what Žižek
might call “enjoyment as an intellectual factor” by
publishing scholarly and personal essays that
themselves give pleasure. (Kamps and Watson 2)
First of all, mourning. We will be speaking of
nothing else. It consists always in attempting to
ontologize remains, to make them present, in the
first place by identifying the bodily remains and
by localizing the dead (all ontologization, all
semanticization . . . finds itself caught up in this
work of mourning but, as such, it does not yet
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think it; we are posing here the question of the specter, to the specter).
(Derrida 9)

L'Allegro, Il Penseroso; gang of pleasure, gang of pain; Team Jouissance, Team
Specter. Running over and through this field, I really want to run around it: to
run, if nowhere else, amok. But for me there is no other way. If I am to write
this essay, I have to navigate the work of mourning in order to arrive at plea
sure's archive, sliding between opposing manifestos, hoping to create a small
universe in which I can suture two inverse inclinations — namely, our irre
pressible longing for pleasure and our traffic in specters: our omnivorous con
versations with the implacable dead.
As I start to write this an announcement comes in from Pretoria. Five of
the murderers of Steven Biko have confessed under the auspices of a general
amnesty. A few days later, The New York Times article on Biko’s death features
a strange double picture from a museum exhibit in Pretoria. At its outer reach
es the camera has recorded a grand, upflung portrait of Bikos head — suggest
ing a persona already classicized, at a distance, monumental, heroic. A didactic
body, yes, but also, in its way, a body
pleasure, evoking identification with
the spirit of a deeply ethical man. Beneath this picture the
has flung
another replica of Biko’s person (this time solid, tactile, plastic, inert) depicting
a body facedown, on the floor, bound, contorted, bleeding, opened: a terrifying
representation of a person battered and left to die on the floor of a South
African jail (Burns 4).
Between the heroic picture and its obscene plastic double, this exhibit
attempts to instantiate two different versions of mourning. First, it offers a
body that is easy to introject, to sublimate into a system of great, representative
men. But beneath this
portraiture we meet something more tenuous
and closer to home: a body that seems harder to swallow. Instead of Biko’s
greatness we are reminded of the power of his political adversaries and his own
loss of agency: of flesh that is open to brutality, inertia, decay; of a world unap
proachable through grief but openly melancholy over the body’s vulnerability
and its unfinished projects — a space with too much ancestry. In presenting a
butchered body that refuses to be consumed (tipping the viewer back and forth
between anger and melancholy, between heroism
the desuetude — the dis
quiet — of unusable grief), this double picture attempts,, as Derrida says, to
“ontologize remains,” to give them density, spatiality, to identify bodily remains
“by localizing the dead.”
How do we speak to the dead? Or speak about them? What weight should
they have in our texts? Last week I waved the picture of Biko’s bodies at
students, trying to drive home the contrast between the semiotics of the
upflung body and the relentless grotesque, trying to say, “Look, body politics is
not just a topic in this course but a set of tropes we constantly deploy.” And yet
my voice breaks when I talk about the body that inhabits the bottom half of the
frame, and I think, I don’t like my dead to
this local. It upsets the balance,
calls out too many ghosts. But every time I get rid of one ghost, another
its place. This time I am shopping. I see a placard in the back window of a
van. “My son was killed
a drunk driver. I am MADD.” Once again
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the unexpected ontologizing of remains, the making present, the relentless
localizing. I want to walk away,
yet my own flesh surprises me with its
vehemence, an anger directed not at the drunk driver, but at the narrator, the
of this car. I think, "Why is she saying this to me?” before I construct
the proper empathic response. Of course this woman has as much right to hurl
invectives, to call out the ghost, as anyone.
What do we owe to the dead?
IRA nationalists (those who became
political prisoners during the 1970s and supported
Sands throughout
the Hunger Strike of 1981), the dying demanded a special brand of silence; they
a painful new consciousness about the irrelevance of everyday speech.
When a guy was on hunger strike in the wing, the noise level went down.
Everybody was conscious all the time that there was someone next to you
dying. When the food came around you had to be conscious about not
shouting, "What do you think of the meat today?” Your complaints were
relegated to something meaningless. You couldn’t go to the door and shout,
"There’s something with this grub.” (Feldman 248)

It seems all too clear what
owes to the dying, but with the dead, the case
seems utterly different and perhaps more diffuse:
The night Bobby
died was just... you never heard a sound for hours.
Nobody spoke and nobody would go near the door. The way we knew
was dead, a screw
down and there was a grill at the end of the wing,
and with his baton he started banging the grill slowly, Dong! — dong! —
dong! — like a church bell. It was just a hollow
From that point
whenever someone died the screws would ring the grill and another one
would walk up the wing slowly pulling a trolley behind him, saying, "Bring
out your dead. How many dead do youse have
us today?”: It was like
the plague. (249)
Once we enter this hollow space and try to imagine Sands’s slow and deliber
ate death, the thematizing question — what do we owe to the dead? — seems
both impertinent and much too obtuse. And yet deferring this question seems
equally counterproductive. We need to take note of the ease with which Bobby
Sands’s heartbeat, his voice, can be displaced by a screw, a prison guard, bang
ing the grill slowly. As the guard cries out in his mocking voice, the empty
space left by a man’s death becomes frighteningly co-optable, available to oth
ers; it demands renewed efforts at counter-speech. Yet how do we narrate or
speak for the dead? What allows this speech to grant them proper weight, sub
stance, dignity? If this weight is too heavy, can we go
writing? Do we want
to? If the weight is too light, can we do justice to the injustices endured by the
specter?
In interviews with members of the IRA prison collective recorded in Allen
Feldman’s Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror
in Northern Ireland, we learn that for those who bore witness to Sands’s death,
"a new sense of urgency ... set in all around. It meant that you were scrubbing
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[writing] all day. . . . [I]t gave everybody a sense of doing something” (247). It
is the question of writing, of finding proper tropes, that obsesses Sands’s fellow
prisoners:

The Hunger Strike completed the textualization of the prisoner’s body. As
Bobby Sands and subsequent hunger strikers lay dying, the rest of the Blan
ketmen engaged in the intensified production of political texts that were
smuggled out of the prison. These texts constituted a literature of conver
sion, letters to international organizations, political groups, unions, govern
ments, and prominent individuals which publicized the Hunger Strike and
asked support
the protest. Certain prisoners writing with pen refills on
cigarette papers were able to produce 200 letters a day. It was a remarkable
literary production which seemed to flow directly from the dying body of
the hunger
(250)
The ventriloquism we lend to the dead, the tropes we clothe them in, can have
the power to re-dress their
to speak volumes.
Differently positioned (not only not incarcerated, but at relative leisure to
pursue polymorphous political passions), liberal academics also reproduce for
themselves and their students stories of trauma, structural violence, systematic
injustice, slaughter, inequality. These painful stories — about deterritorialization, decolonization, people pushed past the margins, bodies brutalized, chil
dren victimized, populations dying, in exile — suggest a world of subsemantic
history that demands the weight of political speech. At the same time (or with
the same heterodox space but under another name), we inhabit
academic
world that is busy consuming trauma — busy eating, swallowing, perusing, con
suming, exchanging, circulating, creating professional connections — through
its stories about the dead. We are obsessed with stories that must be passed on,
that must not be passed over. But aren’t we also drawn to these stories from
within an elite culture driven by its own economies: by the pains and pleasures
of needing to publish, by salaries and promotions that are themselves driven by
acts of publication, by, among other forces, the pleasures of merely circulating?
From within this complex matrix of pleasure and pain, I want to come back
to my earlier question. Given the danger of commodification and the pleasures
of academic melancholy — of those exquisite acts of mourning that create a
conceptual profit — what are our responsibilities when we write about the
dead? In describing the fate of
Sands, or the bodies of "cunts” (desig
nated male victims of political violence) and "stiffs” (dead bodies that deliver a
""message” of feminization to the other side) that have transformed Belfast’s
political geography, does Feldman meet these responsibilities, does he take the
right tone? Do I? How are we allowed to taste the dead’s bodies, to put their
lives in our mouths? How do we identify the proper tone, the proper images,
for holding — for awakening — someone else’s bodily remains?
This question has been called forth unexpectedly, reluctantly, unpre
dictable by the last issue — also the first issue — of Journal x. Turning its
pages with a prospective happiness and dread (a bizarre, all-too-familiar hap
bred of proprietorship: there’s my name, I’m part of this editorial board;
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there’s my space, I’ve been asked to write a review-essay on “Reading for Plea
sure”), I’m enjoying myself I
reading about late-night TV in the essay on
Céline and “Lettermania”; I’m interested in Civil-War American freaks, and
then I turn to the next to the last essay, “Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmak
ing Mississippi’s Jails” — thinking randomly, circumlocuitously (as I sit in
the dusky half-light of a midwestern afternoon, awash in that meditative fren
zy bred of reading too much southern literature) — I think — oh, here’s a piece
on the South, and I dive into the article, feet first, before my exuberance turns
to
“Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails” is an essay
that begins with portraits of black men who have died
Mississippi’s jails.
Andre Jones, the son of local NAACP activists, was brought to the Simpson
County Jail on August 22, 1992, on multiple charges that included carrying a
concealed weapon and possessing a stolen vehicle. He was 18. Less than twen
ty-four hours later Jones was found hanging in his cell — dangling from the
shoelace of his own Nike sneaker.
Reading this essay about Andre Jones and other people who have died in
Mississippi’s jails, I no longer feel able to write about my own acts of reading
for pleasure. Instead, I want to take up the status of griefwork, of the work of
mourning, in academic writing. What happens when we “textualize” bodies,
when we write about other people s deaths (or other people’s cultures) as some
thing
“reads”? The author of “Estranged Fruit,” Barry Gildea, argues that
“jails are sites for complex and plural readings, especially where contested hang
ings occur. The incidental death category marks the first opportunity to
explore a more imaginative or creative interpretation of the jail hanging as a
mythic and literary act of incidental annihilation through intentional civil dis
obedience” (124). What does it mean to convert someone’s death while in cus
tody into a “literary act”? If this
in fact, a suicide, how should we respond
to the suggestion that Jones’s failure to leave a suicide note must be “read” as an
act of resistance? (That is, what constitutes proper evidence
drawing such
a conclusion? Who is doing the “writing” here — and why?) Or how do we
evaluate this conclusion: “By resisting the urge to determine and dictate the
meaning of his death, Jones has insured that he will be
He imposes no
meaning, but still ‘imprisons’ you within a text, a world of his own (un)making,
a world which soon becomes peopled with the texts of other hanging bodies”
(116)? In what sense can a hanging body be “a text”? What happens when
“imprisons” becomes a floating signifier that slips away from its referent so eas
ily? No longer a description of the physical crisis experienced by a black man
in custody, it becomes a loosely held metaphor describing the psychological sta
tus of an elite group of readers.
This transferability suggests a too easy equivalence between epistemologi
cal prisons and actual ones, between the dead
the living. What are the dan
gers inherent figuring — or dis-figuring — the specter? How far should we
go in invoking the ghost, how far in consuming its traumas? If circulating the
suffering of others has become the meat and potatoes of our profession, if this
circulation evokes a lost history but also runs the dangers of commodification,
then how should we proceed? In producing figures that are either too vacuous

Published by eGrove,



 and


5









Journal X, Vol. 1 [], No. 2, Art. 6

230

Journal x

or too lurid, too theatrical or too theoretical, can one reproduce trauma or loss
in the wrong way? To put this somewhat differently, how do we control our
own acts of écriture, of seeming to
bodies, when we may really be reading,
then acting upon (interpreting and reinscribing) our own figurations?
To answer these questions, my argument needs to extend beyond
“Estranged Fruit’”s local strategies. To stay honest, I will have to turn back on
my own mode of troping the death of Steven Biko, my own act of
the
specter. (Is this a too opportunistic, too lurid way of inviting the audience into
this essay? And who decides?) But I also want to focus on two urgent ques
tions. First, what is the role of the critics own writing in producing someone
else's death as a “text”? Second, what resources should
bring to bear in
ventriloquizing the world on behalf of non-elites — how conscious should we
be about usurping others’ worlds with our words? These are questions with
subtexts: in asking whether there are proper and improper styles for eliciting
the stories of the dead, we need to reexamine the appropriations of anthropol
ogy’s powerful methods within the burgeoning field of cultural studies. And in
asking whether we can participate in critique without overriding the effects and
affect of local mourning, we need to reexamine the thematics of loss that so pre
occupies a post-Marxist academy. For if the abiding question of this essay is
what we owe to the dead, this question has to be nuanced once again. The
question is not only what is our stake in their narratives, but what is their stake
in ours.
With these questions in mind, let us turn again to “Estranged Fruit: Mak
ing and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails,” for
is an essay that speaks about
the recently dead, of a young black man, and then another black man, of white
men and women, all found hanging. The deaths of these black men while in
custody have been interpreted by their own African-American communities as
lynchings but labeled officially as suicides. Gildea’s verdict, as well, is that these
deaths are suicides, that they “indicate a strong commitment to live or die
a
nomos other than that of the state of Mississippi: namely, the dignity, honesty,
and sovereignty of a pure form of American individualism. Inmate suicide is a
singular act of subversion, both a renunciation and an enunciation of violence”
(139).
Before launching into my critique — set off, in part, by disbelief in such
purity — I should say that I’m convinced Gildea embarked on this essay with
the best will in the world — that is, with every intention of making new space
for the dead to speak. But
me the fine line between ventriloquism and
depersonification (what I will later describe as the de-anthropomorphizing of
the persons of black men who have died while in custody) gets breached
again and again, perhaps because Gildea is so eager to close the door on the
possibility that these men were murdered; or perhaps because, in the specter’s
presence, “appropriate” acts of personification are hard to control. In any event,
Gildea argues that the quick availability of southern narratives of lynching for
describing deaths while in custody may cause politically minded, left-leaning
critics to
the despairing sense of agency that drives some men and
women to kill themselves while in jail. That is, enthralled by victims’ stories,
critics of state
may fail to register an inmate’s desperate attempt at
embodied protest.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol1/iss2/6
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But the desire to construct this alternative scene of instruction is complex
ly motivated. Gildea
that the “theory” that Jones and his compatriots
were lynched “has abstracted the villains, so that all of white Mississippi is
implicated as a mob” (120). Indeed? What are the authors own transference
points, the nodes of racial crisis or white writing that motivate such
tions? What anxieties might the narrative of a black mans “heroic” suicide
attempt to ward off? Later in this essay I want to generalize from the particu
lars of this essay to explore the problems in transferential thinki that can
remain sublimated or subliminal within the current methodologies of cultural
studies. But for now, let me
that Gildea’s argument about heroic sui
cides in custody suffers from numerous epistemological glitches, including its
misapplication of a romantic
of unified selfhood (felt in the invocation
of “a pure form of American individualism”), its description of the possibility of
a purely instrumental response to prison trauma (in ecstatic tones reminiscent
of Byrons “The Prisoner of Chillon”), and its ends-dominated interpretation of
events (the notion that we’re allowed to write history backwards, from results
we can see to intentions we can only intuit). But however strong my sense of
epistemological recoil at the model of history that constructs these conclusions
— the teleological assumptions about how history works, the transcendental
assumptions about how imprisoned subjects function — my first response,
reality, was not this academic.
What disturbed
even more than this essay’s facts or its argument is the
question of how the dead are narrated — how their bodies are glossed. The
pivotal, mediating figure, the point of transference that introduces this essay, is
Andre Jones, a black man found hanging by his own shoelace. The section
introducing his story begins with a subtitle, “Starting on a Shoe String,” a string
of words that makes Jones’s body the subject of cleverly nuanced academic play.
What is gained by this painful irreverence, by a pun that works over and
through a dead man’s body with the cavalier bitterness of a good Gershwin
song? I think, what am I able to demand of the author of this or any essay, as
she or he holds open the bodies of others for my gaze? I think, language is dif
ficult, and
never go into their concepts without leaving something
behind, without leaving a remainder. But in this essay that so appalls
I find
something more than a remainder: I find too many remains. There are too
many bodies
and too little care for them.
However bitterly or acerbically it is meant, the pun “starting on a shoe
string” functions too glibly to lighten the burden of writing about the dead. In
taking a body already disfigured by violence and making a “figure” out of it —
a trope, a pun, a sleight-of-word — the author relocalizes Jones’s death, his
bodily remains, within the entrepreneurial space of academic play. Elsewhere
in the essay this disfiguration seems even more
For Andre Jones, jail hanging
have been a somatic form of cultural crit
icism attesting to the incontestable reality of the pain and torture of Mis
sissippi jails. But as Scarry would predict, the “language” of this hanging
event is not entirely clear. You cannot be sure what the hanging is “saying”
about the pain of the inmate. This linguistic problem calls into question
the source and agency of Jones’s unmaking.
Published by eGrove,
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Scarry’s work emphasizes the importance of reading the body as a text,
a valuable approach to the story of Jones’s death. The posture of Andre
Jones emphasizes the body in a way that cancels the contents of the world:
the suspension of a body from the
bar, dangling
fruit, fleshy,
pulpy, a
solid. The human involved is reduced from a sentient
being into a mere body, matter, the object of gravity’s pull. In the case of
Jones, a single shoestring unmakes the made,
in his world shoes were
both a possession of
and a position of plight, as in “I wouldn’t want
to be in your shoes.” His hanging synthesizes
connotation so that the
plight of pain becomes objectified and he
like the shoe, some
thing that dangles from a string. Andre Jones the sentient being
and is represented by a black Nike hightop sneaker, the kind young urban
blacks sometimes kill for. Because of shoes, some urban teenagers kill oth
ers; by means of shoes, do some jailed urban teenagers kill themselves?
Andre Jones did not kill for shoes but instead died by
of them,
Mississippi-made body transformed into both a shoe and a field of crisis.
Unfortunately for Mississippi, however, the hanging of Andre Jones has the
appearance of bearing the antecedent state insignia of lynching. (115)
These paragraphs ride on the same somatic techniques that the Pretoria muse
um exhibit uses to vivify Steven Biko’s death; they swerve between a heroicizing classicism and the prurient anarchy of the grotesque. The author begins
with a small gesture of heroism. If Jones has killed himself, this act becomes a
form of “somatic cultural criticism”: that is, in death his body is wedded to the
ory; it becomes a visceral act of cultural critique (it is “like” a cultural critic’s acts
of cultural criticism). But almost immediately Gildea retracts this violent yok
ing of unlike subjectivities, and his text moves dialectically to acknowledge that
the remains of this death are bodily, not linguistic, so that any act of reading”
must come to a halt, at least until “theory” can come to the rescue. To cope with
the subject’s silence, the critic must borrow figures that permit the reading of
this body as text: a valuable approach.” (But valuable for whom? Who prof
its when someone’s else’s body is turned into a set of tropes to be perused as
academic commodity? Here even silence can become a surplus value the read
er can reap.)
Here two different
of problematic thinking become visible. First,
this paragraph appropriates figures from Billie Holliday’s “Strange Fruit,” a bit
ter
about the effects of lynching and mob violence in the postbellum
South. In the initial verse of this song, death is almost made bearable — it is
lightened — by displacing the traumas endured by once-living men onto an
aestheticized object from the natural world: “Southern trees bear strange fruit,
/ Blood on the leaves and
at the root. / Black bodies swinging in the south
ern breeze, / Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.” But while “men” and
“fruit” are so easily linked, what the
points to again and again is the dis
tance between the living metaphor and the dead body. That is, the fact of dis
placement (the way that the personification of “fruit” is so eerily mapped onto
the de-anthropomorphized bodies of black men) in itself makes a political
statement. It suggests that these bodies have already endured such displace
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ment long before their death. In the pre-civil-rights South, African Ameri
cans, whether dead or alive, were barred from crossing the symbolic threshold
into personification; from the perspective of the dominant culture they were
forced to hover the uncivil space between human and inhuman worlds. As
Hortense Spillers describes the lives of black women during this period:
Slavery did not transform the black female into an embodiment of carnal
ity at all, as the myth of the black woman would tend to convince us. She
became instead the principal point of passage between the human and non
human world. Her issue became the focus of a cunning difference . . . the
route by which the dominant male decided the distinction between human
ity and other” . . . [decided that] black is vestibular to culture. In other
words, the black person mirrored for the society around her what a human
being was not. (76)

Billie Holliday’s song defines the hanging
of black men as another point
of impossible passage. That something as heavy as a body can be made so light,
so irrelevant, so metaphoric, is the first ironic point of this song. The second is
that this very lightness is only possible because African-American men have
already been de-anthropomorphized by white society. Thus Holliday’s allusion
to the lynched bodies of black men as ‘strange fruit” resounds so caustically
because these men have died several deaths. As metaphors, the songs spectral
bodies offer a doubly mimetic space, the frightening specter of “emphasis
added” to injury. This
not only calls out to the traumas endured by black
men but
a space for exploring the dehumanization (the lost personhood
or personification) suffered by the African-American community at large. The
re-imaging and de-animation of black
as “fruit for the crows to pluck”
offers a commentary not only on the practice of lynching but on a white meta
physic that makes blackness vestibular to humanity.
My central critique of Gildea’s “reading” of Andre Jones’s body is that his
metaphors are complicit in rather than critical of these older acts of dehuman
ization. He
what the Holliday song knows too well: namely, that the
dangers implicit in the rhetoricization of a black man’s body can have material
effects — that the depersonification of African Americans is an ongoing, repet
itive stratagem within American history. The argument his essay proposes —
that in creating his own hanging death, Andre Jones “objectifies” himself on his
own shoestring — seems too self-serving. In “Estranged Fruit” men are made
into metaphors so they can be harvested by the critic.
To put this somewhat differently, the racially-marked bodies of Gildea’s
essay seem all too available for acts of rhetorical seizure and conceptual vio
lence. Gildea begins his essay with the deaths of two black men, Andre Jones
and David Scott Campbell, even though he wants to argue that the inmate “sui
cides” in Mississippi’s jails are evenly distributed among black and white males
as well as among black and white females. Color is esssentially effaced as a topic
here, but it is all too present as the spectacular site of exoticism and readerly
transference. What part does race (or ethnicity or sexual or religious prefer
ence) play in making bodies available for academic consumption? For example,
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in the paragraphs just cited, Jones’s body is said to cancel the world. (But does
it? For whom? For his parents? His peers?) A string of metaphors follows, as
if the body of a hanged man could dangle from a series of tropes, transformed
from fruit to shoe to ghetto tough: a persona killed (or killing) because of his
shoes; a person who is already depersonified.
And this is my second critique of the problematic thinking that makes
lurid figures possible.1 While "world-canceling” is meant to suggest the world
negating capacities of suicide itself, this cancellation of the world, offers a limit
case for examining what happens when we read synecdochally, when a
becomes a “text,” is excerpted from its context, and then asked to re-represent
the meaning of this dissipated context. That is, this
of world-canceling
marks the spot where Gildea’s own prose starts to saturate the dead man's “evac
uated” space; this is the beginning of a series of phrases that attempt to make
trauma available for a certain kind of argument, a certain kind of consumption.
What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric?
Let me give a brief overview. First, we are told that Jones’s dead body is
hanging, like fruit, like the hanged men from the
Billie Holliday song. But
if it’s “like” a fruit, it’s also not like a fruit at all: a shower head is not a branch,
a shoe string is not a twig, and Jones lived and died in a postmodern era, when
even the Ku Klux
has its own web site. So, the author
this
body is not such “strange fruit” after all; instead, it is “like” a shoe — it hangs
from a shoe string, doesn’t it? And “young urban
” sometimes kill each
other for their shoes — that’s common knowledge, isn’t it? — whether such
“knowledge” is relevant to Jones’s life or not. (Notice how cultural context
returns in this selective way as the outgrowth of the textualization of Jones’s
body, of the selective pressures of a chosen field of synecdoches). Well, if kids
kill themselves for shoes, then why not with shoes? All this demands is the shift
of one preposition — not a big deal. The body becomes — not itself—but an
effect of reading. It is transformed into an Ovidian site that can be manipulat
ed for the sake of a certain form of academic mastery.
What I
trying to show, in crudely approximating the logic that drives
these two paragraphs, is the way this narrative mimics a set of techniques that
cultural critics use all the time, techniques that cultural
borrows from
anthropology and anthropology borrows from literary criticism: a method
James Clifford calls “textualization.” (It occurs in “Estranged Fruit” when a
young man’s body is excerpted from both its jailhouse and neighborhood con
texts and made into the critic’s own plangent metaphor: “a black Nike hightop
sneaker.”)
For Clifford, textualization “is the process through which unwritten behav
ior, speech, beliefs, oral tradition, and ritual come to be marked as a corpus, a
potentially meaningful ensemble separated out from an immediate discursive or
performative situation” (38). This corpus has extraordinarily mobile and
metaphoric properties. By extrapolating one detail from a cultural context and
making that detail into a “text” — a site for interpretation, for reading — what
emerges is a gathering of synecdoches that can be read in isolation from their
dialogic field, allowing a world to reemerge under the control of images that the
critic herself chooses to emphasize. In other words, a part is used to reconstruct
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the meaning of the whole, but with content and context blown away. When
context reemerges, it comes not as itself, but as a narrative spun out of the
interpreter-anthropologists poesis, her own acts of making.
The dangers of this spinning are obvious. That is, by extrapolating one
detail from its “background” and designating that detail as a meaning-filled
“text,” what
is the invention of a tropological field that grows out of
the abstracted detail itself. Even more disconcerting, the evacuation of a par
ticular context can be disguised in tropes of abundance that both dehumanize
the body and make it into an object so we can continue to “read” it — that is,
to recreate it by piling metaphors and similes upon it so that it becomes some
thing other than “itself.”
This observation poses an additional problem. In perusing Andre Jones’s
death we can say that there is, of course, no “self”
at all. What happens
when the corpus is really a corpse? You’ think the dead would be silent, overeasy, eager for the materiality bestowed by some critic’s “texting.” But the very
opposite seems true, for the invocation of “Strange Fruit” has already sum
moned the borrowed figures of the dead into the margins of this essay — and
once they are summoned, they will not bow down. “Scent of magnolia, sweet
and fresh / Then the sudden smell of burning flesh. / Here’s a fruit for the crows
to pluck. / For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck. / For the sun to rot, for
the tree to drop. / Here’s a strange and bitter crop.” Holliday’s
is acrid and
heavy; it conjures the weight of the dead to testify around the “corpus” of
another hanged man. Later, I want to address the problematic use of “Strange
Fruit” as metaphoric space for imagining “the new” (here, as a set of metaphors
that Gildea uses to construct an alternate theory of violent death while in cus
But for now, let me simply suggest that the ways in which this song is
made formulaic and the
of refutation has the
of making the
specter emerge even more palpably.
What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric? Rhetoric seems complic
it in evacuating these dead men’s worlds; it cancels the brutal facticity of the
body’s
fate for the appropriative potentials of metaphor. At the same time,
some form of troping, of de- or re-anthropomorphizing, is inevitable whenev
er we speak of the dead. Given the fact that the dead can only live as tropes, as
figures,
the remainder of this essay I want to explore the repercussions of
this problem
cultural criticism.2 I want to take on a series of open topics or
questions.
1) How do we account for, and respond to, the weight of the dead and the
potential dissipation of the body in writing?
2) What does it mean to make the dead into “texts”?
as my colleague
Marlon Ross has asked, what are the
of doing anthropology with a
dead subject?
3) What is the relation between reading (or writing) for pleasure and the
specter? Marx suggests that the dead — not as the facts but as the “figures” of
history —
revolutions: their bodies are given leading roles in political
movements and documents; their speciality offers the metaphoric foundation
of the new. If the specter provides the tropes we push off from, or push away
from, in order to suggest other, more utopian orders, what can we conclude
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about the relation between the spectral and the pleasure of “the new”? Or, to
make a more local intervention, how does excitement about new ideas (part of
Journal xs motive in creating a journal focused on pleasure) depend
the
specter, rest on the spectral properties — the tropics — of the dead?
4) Finally, what is the status of griefwork and the thematics of loss within
the fin de siècle academy? How should we respond to, and in what tones should
write about, our obsessive recoveries of subsemantic histories? Are we
inventing new “brands” of transgenerational haunting? Or is academic con
sumerism an inevitable outgrowth of the culture of late capitalism that
theless makes a crucial space for recovering the lost topos of transnational,
transinstitutional mourning?

1. The Weight of the Dead
The Communist Manifesto begins with a ghost: “Ein Gespenst geht um in
Europa — a specter is haunting Europe.” But in Specters ofMarx Derrida stalks
the ghost of Marx himself. He wants to conjure not only with the lost ghosts
of communism but with Marx’s own obsession with specters:

Men make their own history [ihre eigene Geschichte} but they do not make it
just as they please [aus freien Stücken]; they do not make it under circum
'
es chosen
themselves,
but under circumstances
directly encoun
figures
his
tered, given and transmitted from the past [überlieferten Umständen]. The
creatlike
tradition of all the dead generations [aller toten Geschlecter] weighs [lastet]
a nightmare on the brain of the living. (Quoted in Derrida 108)

by

In calling out to the specter we encounter a new kind of nightmare: not the
gothic terror of being haunted by the dead, but the greater terror of not being
haunted, of ceasing to feel the weight of past generations in one’s bones. That
is, the words we use to hold the dead, to call out to them, are too porous, too
leaky. Even the English version of Marx’s phrase, “the tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living,” has more heft
in the German. In Marx’s original text, the specter “‘lastet wie ein Alp,’ that is,
weighs like one of those ghosts that give nightmares; the French translation
reads simply pese d’un poids tres lourd,’ weighs very heavily; as often happens
in translations, the ghost drops off into oblivion or, in the best of cases, it is dis
solved into approximate
” (Derrida 108).
The problem haunting my essay is precisely the danger of this dissolution
of the dead into “approximate figures.” Take, for example, my own attempt to
invoke the ghost in the paragraph on Steven Biko that begins this essay. Here
I want to instantiate a physical dignity for the dead, to invoke the terrors of
imprisonment and choicelessness (the nightmare weight that descends upon
Biko) as well as the forces of history that Biko, in
political actions, sought
to lift. I want some portion of this weight to descend on the reader’s body, to
e a burdensome space for thinking about the relationship between repre
sentational melancholy and political praxis.
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But as soon as I open this scene, something else starts to happen; I remo
bilize the specter for a different set of rhetorical ends . Planning to talk later in
this essay about what happens to black men in prisons, I ask the invocation of
“Biko” to set the scene. His body lends itself to the project of making this essay
into a well-working object, an echo chamber
my most urgent ideas. In the
midst of such considerations, where are we, how close to the ghost? And what
happens to the
the figuration of mourning? I write a sentence, then
strike it out: “I wanted to name my son after Steven Biko, but couldn’t, didn’t
— a martyr’s name. But aren’t half the
in the white man’s canon mar
tyr’s names — just buried under centuries of overuse?” It sounds too personal,
it breaks the tone, draws too much attention to my own psychic investments in
this project when I want to draw out something more serious. But one of my
criticisms of Gildea’s essay is precisely the question of transference. In making
a body into a text, what investments does the cultural critic bring to her work,
and when should they become visible?
Meanwhile, I’m looking over my shoulder and thinking about audience:
how well is
interpretation taking hold? Am I doing better than other inter
pretations? But before resolving this problem my efforts to invoke the specter
are taken over by the sheer delight of thinking, by the spectacular lure of analy
sis. Invoking the ghost, I become half-acrobatic, take pleasure in associative
vertiginousness and move farther from the
of the specter. That is, the very
act of thinking about the spectral object makes it even more spectral. Theodor
Adorno defines the problems that the thinking subject encounters in each
of definition or analysis his Negative Dialectics:

The spell cast by the subject becomes equally a spell cast over the subject.
Both spells are driven by the Hegelian fury of disappearance. The subject
is spent and impoverished in its categorial performance; to be able to
and articulate what it confronts . . . the subject must dilute itself to the
point of
universality, for the sake of the objective validity of those def
initions. It must cut loose from, itself as much as from the cognitive object,
so that this object will be reduced to its concept, according to plan. The
objectifying
contracts into a point of abstract reason, and finally
into logical noncontradictoriness. (139)
This is a ponderous passage containing a crucial idea. First Adorno marks the
impoverishment of the subject, of the “texting” person. In seeking definitions
or articulations with “objective validity” the subject cuts herself loose from the
cognitive object. This object, in turn, is cut loose from everything except for its
"concept,” its dematerialized idea. In writing or thinking we experience a need
to turn things into concepts so that they can be spoken about. But this very
need casts a spell that breeds disappearance: both subject and object are dilut
ed and spent when they are described under a common denominator. Both
object and subject “contract,” in a simultaneous disappearance of two different
contexts. This is the very problem that the double-bodied exhibit the Pre
toria museum is trying — so awkwardly — to make intelligible. Neither of
these bodies allows Biko to haunt us sufficiently; each flirts with the problem
of disappearance.
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I seem to have come to a binary impasse: either the ghost speaks, or we
must endure — that is, become complicit in — its silence, the attenuation of
the dead within the oblivion of approximate figures, figures designed to com
municate but always encountering the emptiness of the concept, the flatness of
theory, the excess of lurid projections, or the instrumentality of the body made
spectacle. But there is a third possibility, one narrated by Homer in The
Odyssey, in the scenes where Odysseus journeys to Hades to talk with the dead.
Abandoning Circe for Ithaca,
is faced with another detour; he
requires “the strengthless
of the perished dead” to
“how to make
your way home on the sea where the fish swarm” (10.540). Faced with this
journey, “the inward heart me was broken, / and I sat down on the bed and
cried, nor did the heart in me / wish to go on living any longer, nor to look on
the sunlight. / But when I had glutted myself with rolling about and weeping,
/ then at last I spoke aloud” (496-9). Odysseus must find a form of speech not
overburdened with grief, with figures of glut or excess. In fact, his strategy for
getting the dead to speak will involve a similar self-regulation. Approaching
Hades, Odysseus digs a pit and pours libations for the dead, “first / honey
mixed with milk, then a second pouring of sweet wine” (519-20). Finally this
pit is filled with the blood of the living:
Now when, with sacrifices and prayers, I had so entreated
the hordes of the dead, I took the sheep and cut their throats
over the pit, and the dark-clouding blood ran in, and the souls
of the perished dead gathered to the place,
out of
brides, and
young unmarried men, and long-suffering elders,
virgins, tender and with the sorrows of young hearts upon them,
and many fighting men killed in battle, stabbed with brazen
spears, still carrying their bloody armor upon them.
These came swarming around my pit from every direction
with inhuman clamor, and green fear took hold of me. (11.34-43)

This “dark-clouding” blood becomes the locus of a bizarre plenitude; it provides
three different conundrums for thinking about the “approximate figures” of the
dead.
First, why is this blood necessary? It would seem that the dead can only
speak when they partake of the things of this world. If the images clothing the
dead are important, it is because these figures are the gateway to their avail
ability. At the same time, the dress that we bestow upon the phantom is
inevitably our own. That is, the trace of the specter s speech resides neither in
the dead's wished-for presence nor in their oblivion, but
their inevitable
hybridity. They must be fed on the life blood, the figures of the present, if they
are to speak.
And here we come to a second conundrum. Odysseus offers this sacrifice
so that the dead can become substantial. But when the phantoms begin to
swarm, Odysseus instructs his men to draw their swords. Initially, only a hand
ful among the restless “hordes of the dead” are allowed to drink; the rest are
withheld figuration. Here we face the question of both posthumous harm and
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equal access to figuration: how do we choose who can speak, how do we account
for the missing persons of the dead? This gatekeeping function or archival cen
sorship provided by historical narrative is also the source of Walter Benjamins
famous call for a materialist, interventionist history,
that reestablishes a
possible voice for “those who are lying prostrate,” that refuses to celebrate either
the victor's monuments or his specters. “To articulate the past historically does
not mean to recognize it "the way it really was’
It
to seize hold
of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.... Only that historian will
have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced
that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy
has not ceased to be victorious” (255). For Benjamin “the way it really was” is
always an invention of the victor’s culture. We find an example in Z Magazine
a parodic portrait of an anchorman reading the evening news: “This just in,
a Pakistani jet crashed into a Libyan cruise ship killing all
passengers
instantly.” In the next frame he looks irritated: “I don’t get it . . . where’s the
story?” A hand juts into the frame with an update and suddenly the anchorman
reads with renewed emphasis: “There were three Americans on board! Oh the
Humanity!” (17). For the phantom to speak, it must participate in the telos of
Odysseus’s journey, in his country-seeking quest.
Given this telos, is it surprising that, among those originally withheld
ration and left in the margins, is Odysseus’s mother? When Odysseus sees her,
“I broke into tears at the sight of her and my heart pitied her, / but even so, for
all my thronging sorrow, I would not / let her draw near the blood until I had
questioned Teiresias” (11.87-9). When his mother speaks, Odysseus wants
nothing more than to hold her: “Mother, why
you not wait for me, when
I am trying / to hold you, so that even in Hades with our arms embracing / we
can both take the satisfaction of dismal mourning? / Or are you nothing but an
image?” (210-14). What kind of mourning is this? Why does Odysseus, who
at first refuses to talk to his mother, now long for her embrace? In addition to
the question of gatekeeping, Homer
a space for meditating upon the
image as a way of both “holding” and “holding off” the material presence of the
dead.3
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau suggests that we are
always at the margins of Hades, always surrounded by meditative spaces that
hold open (and
for) the dead. “There is no place that is not haunted by
many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits one can "invoke’ or not.
Haunted places are the only ones people can live ” (108). But in a letter that
questions these enchantments (at least as they were depicted in a recent essay
collection on The Geography ofIdentity), my friend Richard Godden demurs:
Concerning your account of place as haunted with the residues of wasted
work: the problem is that ghosts are the evacuees of memory and that to
obtain substance they must be shed
the actions (and thoughts) of those
who live. Unless spectres materialize through lived institutions, they will
make no path, leave no track and evaporate. I have always been simultane
ously impressed and skeptical over Volosinov’s claim that “no word forgets
its path” — would that this were so. Surely the linguist meant “ word
should be permitted to forget its path.”
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In search of such memories, what forgiveness, what reprieve? In recognizing
that every space is haunted, we are still at one remove from the enormity of
transgenerational haunting. It is only when someone bears witness or gives the
specter its due (its space of political and institutional articulation) that the
empty images of the dead can be held up and held open. Given the importance
(and impotence) of writing from within the complexity of our own killing
fields, is “textualization” really so bad as a strategy? Isn’t the task of abstraction
a potential response, a valiant attempt to answer Benjamin’s plea for a politi
cally responsible history, one that reaches out deliberately, blindly, to respond to
a moment of danger?

2. Doing Anthropology with a Dead Subject
To answer, I want to look at a series of books that ask whether it is possible to
theorize other bodies, other cultures, while holding open a space for mourning,
for the lost object. What relationship to theory
help us explore our repet
itive love for the specter, our continual pleasure in being haunted by someone
else’s dead?
E. Valentine Daniel refigures these questions in Charred Lullabies: Chapters
in an Anthropography of Violence, a book that
a new anthropological dis
course to describe the results of nationalist violence in Sri Lanka. Daniel began
the research for this volume in 1982, when he planned a trip to collect folk
songs by Tamil women who worked on Sri Lanka’s tea estates. But instead of
lullabies, Daniel encountered a country torn apart by
unstoppable conflict
between Tamil minorities and a Sinhalese majority. He begins Charred Lulla
bies by invoking the results of this ongoing war:

Many have died. To say more is to simplify, but to fathom the statement is
also to make the fact bearable. Tellipali, Nilaveli, Manippay, Boosa, Dollar
Farm, Kokkadicholai — mere place-names of another time — have been
transformed into names of places spattered with blood and mortal residue.
. . . Many have died. How to give
account of these shocking
without giving in to a desire to shock? And more important, what does it
mean to give such an account? That is the burden of this book. (3)
Encountering these suddenly archaic remains, Daniel begins to question not
only the narrative strategies of anthropology but its deepest structures. In con
fronting atrocities, what good are methods or theories "designed to enhance”
our understanding of coherent social units such as castes or clans? These ordi
nary, structure-seeking explanations "had suddenly become inappropriate,”
forcing the anthropologist to turn to more urgent questions. First, how does
one write an ethnography of violence "without its becoming a pornography of
violence”? Theory seems to offer one alternative. It provides a flattening-out
of affect: abstraction instead of prurience. But theory also extracts a cost,
namely, "the price of betraying those victims of violence (and in at least one
instance, a perpetrator of
who wished to communicate with the
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anthropologist and through him to the outside world some part of the experi
ence of the passion and the pain of violence in its brutal immediacy” (4).
The burden of describing the pain of another is daunting, and Daniel
describes the impotence any writer feels the face of this demand. A possible
solution would be to do nothing. But is this an adequate response to the
anthropologist’s dialogic contract with his or her subjects? The questions go
on. How does one protect the anonymity of storytellers whose confessions
single them out as informers? Will Daniel himself be able to return to Sri
Lanka after writing so frankly about the costs of civil war and human torture?
On these several points, Daniel judges his book a failure — the prurience
of violence leaks in and theory is advanced with a vengeance. But in this delib
erate space of imperfection something haunting emerges. By refusing the easy
marriage of theory to world, what we get is a nervous system, an anthropology
anxious about its own logos, a writing that recognizes its own
as writing,
as“anthropography.”4 For Daniel any theory pretending to account for the
facticity of violence or death must stand both under and apart from the mate
riality it theorizes. Interpretation must proceed without complacency about its
own accuracy; theory must never explain or evacuate “its” events. Instead, they
must come together as “jarring juxtapositions.”
While Val Daniel opens a space for contemplating the performance of a
“nervous” ethnography, I want to open a coequal space for becoming nervous
about the strategies of reading implicit in some forms of cultural criticism. To
situate the need for a metapraxis both bold in its interventions and
with
stutterance, I want to
a quick overview of the historiography of ethnog
raphy that James Clifford supplies in The Predicament of Culture, in which
“authoritative,” “interpretive,” and “discursive” anthropology offer three differ
ent sites for interpolating a cultural field.
Clifford
by mapping the techniques deployed by the ethnographer
of the 1920s and 30s,
empiricist who embraced the fiction of an “authorita
tive anthropology.” Defying the contradictory status inherent in the role of
“participant observer,” confident that the monograph could control the dialog
ic textures of other cultures, anthropology became a social “science” based on
the belief that social systems could be abstracted from empirical evidence —
and that these systems were separable from the anthropologist’s own aesthetic
practice. Since observation
amass a discrete body of data to get at social
truth, the eccentricities and discriminating habits of fieldworkers went unsung.
That is, the authoritative anthropologist made herself into a specter. Without
noticing,
provided another culture’s phantasmatic ground.
In the work of Clifford Geertz and Company the field shifts toward “inter
pretive anthropology” and the
nature of “the poetic processes by
which cultural objects’ are invented and treated as meaningful” comes into
greater focus (38). We have already seen that “textualization,” an act of abstrac
tion in which an event or behavior is separated out from a larger strata of mean
ing, comes to
understood as the “prerequisite to any act of interpretation.”
But in this system of deliberate poesis, there are also blind spots. Material that
is excerpted as “text” immediately assumes a stable relation to “context”; there
is insufficient anxiety about the leap to synecdoche. When texts (parts taken
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for wholes) hold still, the ethnographer can assume the role of the traditional
critic: someone “who sees the task at hand as locating the unruly meanings of
a text in a single coherent intention.” But without problematizing “the actual
ity of discursive situations and individual interlocutors,” what gets lost is the
colloquy of the colloquial, the dialogic, the situational basis of all fact-seeking
interactions. In a sense, there are two contexts missing: the ethnographers’ and
the informants’.
And so Clifford clamors for
anthropology of the incommensurable: for
“discursive anthropology,” a mode of writing concerned with “situations of
interlocution” (42). Even
the ground is sticky and the specter may go
missing. How does one “resist the pull toward authoritative representation of
the other”? How “to maintain the strangeness of the other voice” as well as the
quiddities of the exchange that produced that voice? If what emerges in both
“authoritative” and “interpretive” anthropology is the problem of doing anthro
pology not only with abstracted subjects but with a dead or missing anthropol
ogist, discursive anthropology also has its
In trying to give the subject
enough headroom, a discrete space of dialogic response, the anthropologist
compensates with ample quotation. But the danger here is in using quotation
in a subordinate fashion, as confirming testimony (50). How does one write an
ethnography where the subject talks back? (Even worse: how does
write
such an ethnography with the dead?)
Kathleen Stewart’s A Space On the Side ofthe Road provides delicious if par
tial answers. This is a book addressed from the coal mining regions of West
Virginia, a space lacking monumental stature within an American imaginary
where “African-American culture has become the talisman of cultural differ
ence.’” Stewart wants to rethink this dialectic of othering from within the space
of “Appalachia” texted from both inside and out as a backwater, a space on
the side of the road. To make this space almost visible, Stewart argues for the
clashing of epistemologies — “ours and theirs” — and she uses that clash
repeatedly to reopen “a gap in the theory of culture itself so that we can imag
ine culture as a process constituted in use.” “Culture” is redefined as a site “hard
to grasp”; it can
be found in “the perfect text and the quick textual
tion” (5).
To prevent this fallacy of “perfect texting” Stewart projects a mixture of
voices. The rhythms of her book move back and forth between the imperative
voice — “imagine this, picture that” — and fragrant lists that conjure fragments
of places. Jumping from someone’s front porch to a meditation on what it
means to report “place” in this way, Stewart swerves into theory and then back
again, meditating all along on the arc of her own voice. In reporting dialogue
she tries to remember the circumstance of the telling, including her own “aggra
vation” at the “constant proliferation of stories” that will not hold still. Elabo
rating on one community’s self-description as “an old timey place,” she conjures
yards filled with broken washing machines, scraps of metal, and cars belly up;
she demands that we arrest the gestures of “academic essentialism”: “the desire
decontaminated meaning, the need to require that visual,
constructs
yield meaning down to their last detail” (26).
In refusing to galvanize everything “into an order of things” Stewart tries
to deflect “transcendent critique long enough to recognize the practices of con-
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cealment and forgetting inherent in all inodes of explanation, description, and
analysis (71). What if, instead of transcendent codes and systems, “there was
only the anecdote”? What if we refused transcendent theories of culture and
instead flooded our own markets with contaminating voices? What if every
academic appropriation grew “nervous
the wake of its own partial under
standings and dense under the weight of its own political unconscious” (210)?
What then?
Stewart’s call for a nervous system, her refusal of singular, duplicable mod
els, makes for breathtaking reading, but what does it suggest about the specter?
Doing anthropology with a dead
already means that
is well outside
the dialogic, talking with someone who can
talk back. “Interpretation is
not interlocution. It does not depend on being in the presence of a speaker”
(Clifford 39).
I feel this absence most acutely in Feldman’s Formations of Violence, a book
on the recent political struggles between Republicans and
in North
ern Ireland. Here, again and again, terrifying events are torn from their con
text and “textualized.” Often this involves an extraordinary feeling of violation.
Feldman anatomizes a scene of violence and then theorizes the psycho-social
sources of this violence, with little apparent concern for its victims, those
defiled by inventive brands of territorial fury. At the same time, the very
ject of this book is reflected in its methods. Feldman wants to unpack the
volatility of violence, the way it escapes and fractures disciplinary structures,
hacks its way into normative sites of legitimation. A question Formations of
Violence dodges is, how can we talk about those who are offed by political
without replicating its dehumanizations? Within the apparatus of For
mations of Violence, theory itself becomes a kind of torture machine that
processes the dead like so much odd filigree. And yet Feldman’s insight into
the particularly virulent world of injustice within Northern Ireland also “legit
imates” his book’s violent method. We learn that sanctuaries function both to
“territorialize violence” and to create zones of “reversible violence” that contin
ually change the terrain of “barricaded communities” (36). The complex
of “hardmen” (an old breed of Irishmen who handled conflict with fisticuffs)
changes under the pressures of insurgency and counterinsurgency into the vio
lent ethos of “gunman” bent
a new species of genocide. Feldman argues that
the political violence that ricochets throughout the urban environments of the
Irish North offers an underanalyzed , mode of transcription that “circulates
codes from one prescribed historiographic surface or agent to another. . . .
Struggles will
over competing transcriptions of the same body,” fractur
ing
vision of the body as “organic” or “natural” and accelerating one’s sense
of politicized subjectivity (7). In a sense, there is no space for griefwork here
because this book’s own accelerated rhythm of analysis reenacts the circuit in
which violence becomes its own site for intensifying still more circuits of vio
lence.
And yet I also want to argue that something like a “holding” of the violent,
violating, violated subject also occurs in the nervous interstices between Feld
man’s own theories and his recorded interviews with IRA activists imprisoned
by the British government. Here we find a particular intensive example of “tex-
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ting.” For example, Feldman describes the prisons rectal exams as “a ceremony
of defilement and the highest expression of the prison regime’s optical colon
ization of the captive body” — returning us to the question of the pun and
whether the academic writer should abandon the temptation to hypertextualize
an already violated body (174). To refuse to mark this “colonic” space — that
is, to refuse
notice or emphasize a pun already half-present, half-visible,
describing the prisoners’ “colonized” anuses — opens a site of readerly risibili
ty; once noted the pun is so obvious, so very much there. And yet to cite it is
to make the bodies of others too available to the reader’s objectifying gaze.
That is, to pun about rectal extrusion and intrusion (to make the context of
bodily invasion and privation so playful) is to risk excessive figuration. But not
to mark this space of punning violation seems just as reprehensible. As Feld
man argues, for Republican prisoners reduced by this continued defilement, the
colon became wonderfully powerful, allowing colonized bodies to fight back
using the only means available — colon-ically.
The story behind these vagrant figures is textured and complex. Beginning
in 1976 the “Blanketmen” (those IRA prisoners Feldman interviewed who
refused to wear prison uniforms that could divest them of their political status
by labeling them common “criminals”) began their terrible vigil. When prison
authorities refused to grant them political standing, numbers of men lived for
years divested of clothing, shivering in coarse blankets, their nakedness a polit
ical protest against continued deterritorialization. But without the protection
of everyday clothing, these men became extraordinarily vulnerable. They were
terrorized by guards who had easy access to their bodies, so that every available
opening became a portal for excavation. Responding to repeated beatings and
brutal searches of their anal cavities whenever they used the latrines, prisoners
began to cover the walls of their cells with their own feces — to stink the guards
out.
Feldman’s thick descriptions of these atrocities suggest a mode of creative
interpretation stretched past the limit:
The prisoners’ refusal to wear the uniform has been the first interruption of
optical circuits. The guards responded by transforming nakedness into an
obvious surrogate tool of visual degradation in place of institutional cloth
ing. The No Wash Protest by the prisoners reclothed their naked bodies
with a new and repellent surface of resistance. The fecal cell, which the
guards tended to avoid and mainly entered to inflict quick terror, also inter
rupted compulsory visibility. In its soiled condition the cell was no longer
a unidimensional and totally transparent optical stage. The stained walls
and the stench endowed the cells with a sensory opacity, resistant depth,
and blackness within which the prisoners could shelter. There was a strong
analogue between the hiding of contraband by the prisoners in their rectal
cavity and the withdrawal of the Blanketmen into the repelling depths of
the scatological cell. Denied the surfaces of the inmate’s body and the inte
rior of the inmate’s cell by fecal defilement, the prison regime extended its
optic to the colon-ization of the physical interior of the prisoner with the
rectal mirror search. (175)
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Here, I would argue, the practice of “texting” may go too far, but it also fails to
go far enough. That is, Feldman s own colonic text defamiliarizes and disgorges
a context so habitually violent that words can barely contain it. In stretching
ones figurative capacities on behalf of bodies also stretched to the limit,
inventing puns that insistent on making rhetorical capital out of someone else’s
body by means of an extravagant and objectifying poesis, Feldman’s text
becomes frighteningly mimetic. That is, in immersing us so thoroughly, so viscerally in cloacal politics (running the gamut from highbrow theory to lowbrow
wordplay), Feldman’s version of “interpretive” anthropology veers deliberately
off course and
I would argue, “discursive.” This is thick description
with an alienation-effect thrown in: rhetorical cavities held
figures vio
lent and awkward, attempting to make readable (and therefore
the
space of the all too terrible and strange.
In criticizing the hard-troping, theory-hungry bent of Feldman’s prose, I’m
also arguing that its “evacuation” of griefwork or mourning is oddly compensat
ed for by Feldman’s own far-fetched and farcical figurations — images that jolt
us out of a too redemptive, too stultifying pathos. Given this self-contradicting
conclusion, however, why do I object so strenuously when Gildea constructs
equally “creative” and objectifying figures to inscribe the mute surfaces of Mis
sissippi’s dead?
My objection is this: while Feldman tries to find a space to reinscribe the
fecal contexts deliberately created by his informants, Gildea participates in a
form of cultural criticism that doesn’t recognize its own lack of information:
namely, the complexities of doing anthropology with a dead subject who can
not talk back. In the face of this silence Gildea creates a system that forgets to
be nervous about its own certainties:

A convict who commits suicide out of the depths of despondency is an
artist enacting a dream of expressive freedom upon his or her own body. In
the complex creativity of these forty-nine men and women, you can see a
reenactment of the whole history of human thought and art. .. . They per
ceived another form of sleep in their bedsheets. They found a new way to
wear their old jeans. (132)
[S]elf-violence jail . . .
to be witnessed to be validated as
In
part because of the debate over their authorship and their journalistic
depiction as unmakings, the Mississippi jail hangings have not been pre
sented to a public audience as works of
Once revealed as
however, the power of their iconic imagery rises before you. It speaks of
stillness, of liminality and resistance. This is more than giving the finger to
the establishment, or burning the flag, this is offering a dead body as an
installation piece in a disciplinary space designed to be utterly devoid of
artistic expression. (133)

Gildea describes the victims of violent deaths while in custody not only as
“texts” but as self-texting integers (the ultimate fantasy of the body as text, of a
body eager for the critic’s resistant readings). Those who have died ambigú-
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ously in jail become death artists, deliberate artificers of their own transcen
dental critique.
But where are the voices of Gildea’s informants, where is his nervous sys
tem? To make such a grand argument out of anything but thin air, the cultur
al critic needs to cover a great
of empirical ground, spending time in at
least two different material contexts: in the streets, houses, and offices where
incarcerated subjects roamed before their incarceration, and in the inferno of
Mississippi’s jails. Otherwise the dead offer a too timely Rorschach for the
writer’s own fantasies — especially those deaths whose causes remain ambigu
ous. Any ventriloquism or versioning of these now spectral lives must be large
ly theoretical or imaginary — and must acknowledge the potential arrogance
and inaccuracies of its own hoped-for theories. Might we not see in these still
bodies subjects who, meeting themselves on the way to jail, become frightened,
fragmented, insufficient — suggesting deaths that are just messy and
meaningless rather than blithely agential and perverse? Might we not hear, in
the margins of this essay, the murmurs of bodies that do not speak, because they
did not ask to be unmade but were tortured or murdered or pushed into sui
cide? What kind of “installation space” would this make? “Estranged Fruit”
needs to stutter here, to explore the possibility that some of these forty-nine
men and women might experience their “texting” as posthumous harm, might
not consent to the critic’s own figurations. Without this discursive doubt, with
out an excavation of the critic’s own transferential need to reanimate the dead
“as art,” the critical ecstasy and self-certainty that spin off these spectral bodies
tells us too much. It creates the possibility that these hanged bodies tell us
more about Gildea’s own investments, and still more about the easy commodi
fication of the dead in the face of a critic’s own desire
an “installation piece.”
3. 8c 4. The Academy and the Commodification of Loss, or the Dead as the
Source of the New

The source for this essay has been a gap, a space on the side of the road, in the
margins of the first issue ofJournal x where I lost myself two months ago and
started writing. Turning from Gildea’s penultimate essay
hanged men to
Gregory Ulmer’s playful and erudite “Exhibit X: Hoopla Dreams,” I felt lost.
Is it permissible to make this trek from trauma to pleasure by just turning a
page? What is the status of academic consumerism, of a world of words where
we can channel-surf from trauma to pleasure and back to trauma again with so
little cost?
Trying to reflect upon this discontinuity, I can recognize these feelings as
something perpetual; they recur, for instance, during those dim moments of
(pseudo-)consciousness I have while reading The New York Times. I’ horrorstruck reading an article about Mexico, or Dakar, or Des Moines, or Dubuque,
and then I
at a body clothed by Lord and Taylor and feel reprieve (or
anger, or desire, or bare nausea). On a really self-conscious day, shocked at the
gargantuan presence of these ads next to tiny-print copy about people in pain,
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I think, what kind of world is this? and why do I buy into it? — before butter
ing my bagel, folding the paper and putting my thoughts away How can these
modes of protest and packaging
in the same paper, in the same con
sciousness, on the same page? Why is it so customary to mix our pleasures with
our horrors?
Reading the Times, I know from Benedict Anderson, is a much more com
plicated act than
gathering fads and facts about the world. To marry the
apocalyptic delights of consumerism (brassy women
boas,, quiet young
women buckling their
young men staring back at me with their sweet,
erect nipples) and the chaos of the recently dead or the long dead or the soon
to be dead is a ritual of nationalizing identity. I open my paper and the family
across the street opens theirs — or used to, in any event. A sense of collectiv
ity, of shared facts and shared modes of consumption (of consuming objects
with our trauma) locates the self in a series of self-disciplining spaces.
There is, of course, something similar about the sociology of an academic
journal.
acts of reading construct a community, as, in fact, Journal x
has begun to construct its community around the question of pleasure:
Journal x instructs its reviewers to make pleasure an explicit criterion
acceptance and publication, alongside the more orthodox academic criteria
of originality and responsibility. To poach upon Wallace Stevens’s descrip
tion of the
fiction, the Jx essay must give pleasure, must bring the
thrill of discovery that has always alerted readers to the presence of a firstrate intellect engaged in the exploration of new territory and the definition
of new problems and paradigms. (Kamps and Watson 2)
What does it mean to give an academic audience ‘pleasure”? After thinking
hard about “Estranged Fruit” and the anthropography of violence, I’ve begun to
suspect that such pleasures have a great deal to do with the dead. As Marx
comments in The Eighteenth Brumaire:

And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such
periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the
past to their service and borrow from names, battle cries, and
in
order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured dis
guise and this borrowed language. (103)

Marx suggests that “new problems and paradigms” depend upon the dead’s bor
rowed names. This
that revolutionary thinking is “never free of anxiety”;
or, in Derrida’s haunting of Marx, “conjuration is anxiety from the moment it
calls upon death to invent the quick and to enliven the new, to summon the
presence of what is not yet there” (Derrida 108-9). I would
that such nar
ratives seek an infusion of pleasure
instigating a powerful and satisfying
“out-sourcing” of pain, an observation based on the self-gratifying cling-ons of
late commodity culture. The Nike swoosh manufactured under subhuman con
ditions in Vietnam, the Barbie dolls made in Malaysian sweatshops, represent
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an ultimate out-sourcing of the pain and alienation of labor that a “flexible”
economy makes possible. Do
communities that are pleasure-based
work in a similar way? At the very least, the out-sourcing of pain into the trau
matic narratives we read and write so freely may have the effect of creating a
safely pleasurable source of self-shattering.
In thinking about The Eighteenth
aire, Derrida makes two more obser
vations. First, those dead generations who weigh so thoroughly upon the
“brains of revolutionaries” have a severe spectral density. “To weigh (lasten) is
also to charge, tax, impose, indebt, accuse, assign,
And the more life
there is, the graver the specter of the other becomes, the heavier its imposition.
And the more the living have to answer for
To answerfor the dead, to respond
to the dead... the absence of any certainty or symmetry” (109). But this debt
of responsiveness to spectral thinking creates a strange paradox. The more “the
new” demands change or crisis, “the more one has to convoke the old, ‘borrow’
from it.” The spirit of revolution depends upon, even as it tries to repudiate, his
tory’s specters. Facing this obstacle, Marx hopes for a sea change — a moment
when the true revolutionary will find “the spirit of [a] new language . . . with
out
the old.” But is this anything other than a happy pipe dream?5
According to Derrida, “Marx intends to distinguish between the spirit {Geist) of
the revolution and its specter (Gespenst), as if the former did not already call up
the latter, as if everything, and Marx all the same recognizes this himself, did
not pass by way of differences within a fantastics as general as it is irreducible.
Untimely, out ofjoint,’ even and especially if it appears to come due time, the
spirit of the revolution is fantastic and anachronistic through and through” (Derri
da 112).
Can the same thing be said about the spirit of pleasure? Certainly
“Estranged Fruit” the new can only be mediated, made conceptually profitable
and figuratively
via Billie Holliday’s old song.
Gildea com
ments: “Through the haunting beauty of her singing, Holliday was able to ‘har
vest’ black southern lynchings of the 1930s and 1940s for a national audience,
reaping jazz genius and political outrage from those barbarous acts. In recent
times, Mississippi has produced fresh fruit from new nooses.... Now that these
forces of estrangement have been descried with the help of theories of both
unmaking and making, it is at last possible to harvest the fruit of these Missis
sippi jail hangings” (139). This is not just a question of taste, although “fresh
fruit” is a painful figure (whether it describes murdered bodies or death artists).
Nor is it
a question of what we owe the dead, although this is impor
tant, too. Instead, I want to return to the image itself as commodity. In troping or turning death into figures, writing is once more exposed as an act of
commodification and consumption: a space where death is converted into plea
sure.
Suddenly, we are in the territory of psychoanalysis, of Freud’s death
and pleasure principle, where it is customary to be swept away by gallows
humor so reprehensible and consoling and giddy that it
only repeat itself.
That is, in the very act of telling or troping, the object world is refigured not as
a source of pain but of pleasure: its tension veering toward zero. Can
write
and remain in the unpleasure of death? A question terminable and inter
minable.
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Daniel responds to these puzzles in his chapter on “Embodied Terror.” In
describing the pain of those tortured (by the Sri Lankan Army and by Tamilese
militants), Daniel notes the peculiar de-animation of the men and women who
describe their own torture to others. “There
no signs of contained pas
sion. Rather, attempts to extract information were met with expressions of
utter listlessness. Months later I found out that it was not so much boredom
that weighed down on the victim as it was the overwhelming sense of the sheer
worthlessness of all attempts to communicate something that was so radically
individuated and rendered unshareable” (143). But Daniel goes on to argue
that those who have endured enormous pain may find some reprieve in terror
— the felt remembrance of pain. In “second” or therapeutic terror, “a seis
mic aftershock” goes through the body, terrifying those who are present when a
torture victim is suddenly wracked by sobs or anger or violent shaking or numb
ing withdrawal. These convulsions have been described by a Siddha physician
as “the pain coming out... the trembling and fear that comes through remem
bering terrible acts” (144). This terror is not
emotion that is simply gothic
or void of knowing but an overdetermined site for coming to deal with (not to
heal — it offers no promise of healing) feelings so traumatic that they seem
incommunicable, even to the self who endured them. In second, or therapeu
tic, terror, experiences that seemed utterly alinguistic become something the
psyche can discharge, recharge, find access to, if not control.
By the end of this chapter Daniel discovers, in the poetry and street theater
that flourished during this period, another opening where pain can be dis
lodged “from its fixed site.” Pain stuck “at the brink of language” can be freed
into beauty, riding swiftly into our lives “on metaphor and icons of affect” (153).
But just as swiftly, Daniel pulls back from the affective tug of his own aestheticizing argument. “Too easy,” he insists, much too easy. In seeking comfort in
the process of recovering trauma for
we “need to ride our
between two echoes. . . . Poetry, prose, theater, and painting are not the only
aestheticizing agents. The poesis of culture itself is a narcotic, and as such it
summons us to respond to Emily Dickinson’s charge that ‘Narcotics cannot still
the tooth / That
at the soul’” (153). It seems that we can never be ner
vous enough.
Seeking such nervousness, let me turn to the letter “x.” When I first heard
about Journal x — about the wonderfully new and borrowed name of this ambi
tious new journal — I felt a small shock of pleasure. The “x” seemed so au
courant and flexible, so wonderfully twenty- and thirty-something, so outmodmodish. But thinking about this journal now, as I do, through the scrim
of
derived from hanged bodies and the hard-to-read “scene of the gal
lant South,” I seem to see another “X” in the shadows: namely, the site of pri
vation and
that marks the loss of the African name. The capitalized
“X” of a Black Muslim idiom is not cited here, and yet it resounds in the jour
nal’s margins, an unknown ¿/^variable that conjures up specters from the Mid
dle Passage and beyond. What do we look for when we seek out the “x”? Do
we seek the pleasure of the spectral unknown, or its burden? Perhaps, as a way
of short-circuiting the proprietorship of the name, this “x” must resonate
both contexts, “between two echoes.”
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Let me end with an echolalia — with something like a parable. Last night
at dinner
were playing a “Know Your US Presidents” game with the kids. I
asked Kiri, the -year-old, “Which president freed the slaves?” and Noah, just
3, shouted, “Santa Claus!” We burst into laughter at his vehemence, his cer
tainty, and his obvious pleasure in having such a good answer. He is learning
his history from our culture's Old Masters — discovering, in ways that I’d never
thought possible, the stinging pleasure, the consuming narcotic, the deadening
hope, of recirculating the commodified name.

Notes
I want to thank Marlon Ross, Jason Clenfeld, Barbara Johnson, Colin Johnson,
Judy Kleinman, Marjorie Levinson, Aamir Mufti, Anita Norich, Yopie Prins,
Toby Siebers, P. A. Skantze, Valerie Traub, Bryan Wolf, Mako Yoshikawa, and
many others for the invaluable ideas they contributed to this essay.

1. On the subject of hanging, Paul de Man, and lurid figures, see Hertz.
2. In a moving essay about the the wrinkles and odors that still inhabit the
garments of the dead, Peter Stallybrass writes about inheriting Allon Whites
clothing — and inheriting with it the grief and pleasure, the lingering of some
else’s “human imprint,” even after his death. Stallybrass suggests another
mode of continuity between the living and the dead: “Bodies come and go; the
clothes which have received those bodies survive” (37).
3. To investigate this idea in depth, Christopher Bollas's The Shadow ofthe
Object seems achingly relevant. Bollas asks how we are held by aesthetic
objects, by the shadow of the maternal other that haunts every work of art. He
describes our
environment as “the experience of object that transforms
the
s internal and external worlds” (28). But in talking about, or think
ing with, the dead, one faces the burden of
to become the transforma
tional object oneself. That is, one reshapes material that seems at once too full
and too empty, in need of transformative labor but unable to respond to such
labor — an unknown invariable (see the penultimate paragraph of this essay).
4. The phrase “anthropography” is borrowed from Daniels subtitle. Taus
sig details numerous nervous systems in his description of the social as an ongo
ing state of emergency.
5. This is gorgeously glossed by Gibson-Graham: “When Marx attempts
to banish the specter, in that same moment he sets himself up for a haunting —
by all that must be erased, denied, cast out, mocked as chimerical or belittled as
inconsequential, in order to delimit a certain objectivity. Indeed, the attempt
to banish the specter creates the possibility and the likelihood of a haunting. In
the very moment of exorcism, the specter is named and invoked, the ghost is
called to inhabit the space of its desired absence. The more
attempts to
render it invisible, the more spectacular its invisibility becomes” (240).
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